


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
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Printed for J. RAYMOND.
[Price One Shilling.]

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LETTER.

DEAR SIR,

HAVE received your several importunate Letters for News. When you left us, I promised to write, if any Thing material happened. You might have concluded from my Silence that nothing material has happened. I wish it were in my Power to gratify you at a less Expence than Truth; but I cannot create Facts, and must beg

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your

your Patience; for you may rest assured, that nothing is known to have been done since the Prorogation of Parliament, except what you have read in the Papers, and you may possibly find Reason to make some Deduction from the Intelligence you draw from thence.

You will charge me with imitating my Betters in an affected Ignorance; but, believe me, I am not one of those who wish to be accounted wise, for saying nothing; and, I will venture to say, that there are some of those Betters who are as totally ignorant as myself.

There are different Speculations upon the Reasons of this Secrefy. Some are fanguine in their Hopes, that it promises the Destruction of our Enemies; others, perhaps from the same good Principles, appreappr not

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apprehend, that it threatens what I will not name.

The Public has been alarmed, for feveral Years past, with Apprehensions, I know not how well grounded, that certain Men are admitted to an exclusive Considence where they ought not, in Justice to the Public, to be trusted at all.

Whatever Foundation there may be for this Suggestion, another Rumour is said to be undoubtedly true, that there are Men, who from their Rank, their Office, their Virtues, and their Abilities, are supposed to be privy to every National Measure, but who are treated as suspected Characters, with Coldness and Diffidence, or as the mere Instruments of some Invisible Directors of the Machine, with Infolence and Neglect.

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If you have heard of this, for the Nation has heard it, what can you expect from a private Man, but a dead Silence upon Public Affairs; a Silence, not so much founded in an abject implicit Submission, as in the Public-spirited Doubts and Fears of a Well-wisher to his Country?

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But, it is possible, that this Ignorance, which very considerable men profess, is not the Effect of any uncommon Secresy, but of an uncommon Inanity, a total Suspension of Measures and Councils.

The Body may be so disjointed, that no Member can do its Office; and, what at other Times is thought to demand the United Care and Attention of the Wisest Hands, may be now left to the Operation of Chance. There may be an Inactivity, which naturally can produce Nothing, but from

from which, through the mere Interpofition of Chance, some Event or other, good, bad, or indifferent, may possibly arise.

You have heard of a whimfical Set of Philosophers, who attributed the whole Creation to a fortuitous Concourse of Atoms. The Whim has been exploded.

But, you will hardly believe it, the Atomic Philosophy is crept into Politics; and, as it was refuted before, upon the fullest Evidence of Wisdom and Design, so it is now demonstrated, in this new Sphere, by as full undoubted Evidence, of the Want of Wisdom and Design, of the Want of a System, and of the Want of any Measures that can pretend to the least Appearance of a System.

You will fay that this is News indeed, and very Alarming too. If a meer Nothing

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thing will Alarm you, I can make your Blood run cold with the Nothingness, which is faid to have prevailed for fome Time past, with the Disunion, the Fears, the mutual Distrust, and consequently the Stagnation of Thought, Defign, or Resolution within Doors; which must, in the End, effect a proportionable Inaction without.

I can grant you, confiftently with the Views of Things, all the Merits of our Fleet, and all that has been done, during this middle State, between War and Peace, by the Illustrious Person who superintends it.

But we have an Enemy to grapple with, who will laugh at mere Force. Council is the lasting Safeguard of a Nation. There is a Time in which Force will evaporate in Sound, but Wisdom outlives

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It is by Wisdom and Council that Nations acquire a Superiority over each other. A Wise Administration will surprizingly increase the Force of Steel and Gunpowder. A Memorial, from such an Administration, may sometimes be equivalent to an Armament; for Wisdom, whether National or Personal, will be respected, even when it is not in a Posture to ensorce Respect, by external Terrors.

But the Case is far otherwise with a Weak, Unsettled, Disjointed, and Undesigning Administration. It will consist of Men, who are either too Rash to be Reverenced, or too Timorous to be Feared; of Men whose Timidity will put them upon concealing Early Intelligence of the Designs of an Enemy, and whose Rashness

ness will plunge them into Ruinous Meaures, as soon as those Designs break out into Action; of Men, whose Memorials will be as Light, and as Little regarded, as the Paper upon which they are delivered; for an impotent Remonstrance can be of no more Value than the Paper that is wasted upon it.

I need not ask you, which of the two you would chuse to oppose to French Councils; and, I will not answer, if you should ask me, which of the two we have at present the Happiness, or the Missortune, to be influenced by?

I can truly make one Declaration, and have Millions to support me in it, that we have more Virtues upon the Throne, than ever filled it in any Period of our History.

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We have the Experience of near thirty Years, upon which to ground the most perfect Considence in Him; and, were it possible, for the executive Part of Government to be administered solely by Him, his Enemies, both Foreign and Domestic, would feel the Weight of His Character, and be put to Consusion.

But whilst there are Persons, who publicly Profess themselves Ministers, whilst One considers every Objection to a Measure, as a Personal Attack upon Himself; and another by circular Letters notifies, that he is appointed, to take upon himself the Conduct of a most respectable Assembly, His Majesty cannot be even remotely glanced at, in any Observations upon

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But I need not guard myself to you, who know that my Life and Fortune are devoted to the House of *Hanover*, and that, if ever I censure the Conduct of Public Persons, it is at a Time, when I apprehend the Interests of the Protestant Establishment, in that Illustrious House, to be affected.

I mention this particularly, because a Zeal for that Establishment is become, since the Accession of the present Royal Family to the Throne, the great Criterion of an Honest Administration, as well as of an Honest Opposition.

A Minister, who has any Thing more at Heart, than the Support of the Constitution, will deviate into such Inconsisten-

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g more e Connsistencies cies of Conduct, as will render his Fidelity Suspicious. He will, perhaps inadvertently, resign himself to Men, whose Principles he takes Pains to Disavow, and thus he may almost as effectually betray his Trust, as if he opened one of the Ports of the Kingdom for the Reception of the Abdicated Family.

For fuch a Conduct not only facilitates the Cause of that Family, but weakens the Cause of the Prince, in whose Service he is Retained, by rendering it difficult for any Ally to treat with Confidence, where he finds neither System, nor Principle, upon which to ground a Considence.

But if Silence and Inactivity be all my Complaint, it will be faid there is at least no positive Harm done, and though an effectual Administration should not have been formed, a good Subject ought to be

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peaceable

peaceable and Contented, till he feels some Mischief arising from the Chaos, in which he Supposes his Rulers to be involved.

I grant it, but am not without Apology for my Discontent. If Menenius Agrippa was now alive, he would invert his Fable; and, instead of Shewing the evil Consequence of a War, declared by the several Members of the Body, against the Belly, he would shew, how dangerous it is, for the Belly to claim and retain all the Nutriment to itself, in neglect not only of the Several Members, but even of the Head.

It is impossible to keep up the Attachment of a whole Nation to the wifest and happiest Constitution, unless the Value of it appear to be understood by those, who undertake to preserve it; and unless the same be constantly inculcated, not only by Words and Professions, but by the Union

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Union of Such Men, and the Profecution of fuch Measures, as the Enemies of that Constitution dread.

But if One Man, regardless of Consequences, will assume to himself more than he can execute, and rather than betray his Impotency to those, who can most effectually assist him, will leave the Nation in as helpless a Condition as Himself; and if Another, merely for the Sake of some Accession of Power, will give up his own Opinion, his Friends, and in the End his Country, what will the Public conclude, but that both those Men think no Price too great, to aggrandize themselves, and think the least Part of their Power too great a Sacrifice for the Preservation of the Constitution, or the Support of their Master.

They will consequently, in Time, stand alone. None but Mercenaries, and those very

very dearly purchased, will join them. They will be at a loss what Measures to take, for Every Measure of theirs will be suspected of a sinister Design; and, in the Midst of their Fear and Consusion, they will think MILLIONS squandered in Substitutes, a Bagatelle, if they can but Shelter themselves from the Union which they dread, of Honest Heads and Hearts, against Them and Their Designs.

Indeed, my Friend, my Heart is so full, that I am led insensibly to the obnoxious Point, upon which you desire Information, and which it was my Intention to have evaded, as the Consideration of it will soon be taken up, by abler Hands, in a more proper Place. However your Anxiety upon the Subject obliges me to Some Answer.

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You wish to know the Grounds of the prevailing Rumours concerning Subsidies. I have been confidently assured, that the Fact is undoubted, so far as it respects the Russians and Hessians at least. But the Reasons I have for disbelieving it, are not yet overpowered by Sufficient Evidence, that such a Measure hath been either Advised or Adopted.

If it be undoubtedly true, we must leave it to the Consideration of those, to whom we have intrusted all that is Dear and Valuable to us, as Britons. But till by some more authentic Advices, than any I have yet met with, the Certainty of it is out of Dispute, it becomes us to quiet the Minds of our anxious Friends, by shewing, that, the Rumour is to the highest Degree Improbable.

The

The French have hitherto committed no Hostilities, but America. Their Encroachments there were many Months, if not many Years, antecedent to our Opposition to them; and might, as I am credibly informed, have been amicably check'd before a single Subject of His Majesty could be truly said to be molested; for the Forts they built were a direct Violation even of the Peace of Utrecht, yet they were built at a considerable Distance from the habitable Part of the British Dominions.

An Englishman should blush to Confess how long the Fort on the East of the Falls of Niagara has been built. It was so manifestly erected upon the British Territory, that is in the Country of the Iroquois, that the only possible Claim our Enemies can make to it, is a most Difgraceful one to us, I mean the Claim of Proscription.

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An Encroachment like this, with a Fort to defend it, must have been either not considered at all, or considered as an National Act of Desiance, by those who received the Intelligence. It may indeed be so long ago, that no Person now living may think himself responsible for it.

If this should be pleaded, the Apology will only pave the Way for another Inquiry, not so easily evaded. In whose Administration was Crown Point built? Upon whose Ground? And upon what Pretensions? What were the Views of the French in Building it? And what Obstruction was given on Our Part to the Execution of their Plan in this as well as the other Forts, which command the Lakes Erie, and Ontario, and the River Obio.

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If this Defiance of us, in, I had almost faid the most important Part of the British Dominions, preceded the last War, it will be natural to enquire what Notice of it was taken in the last Peace?

If His Majesty's Plenipotentiaries received no Instruction on that Head, it should be owing to the Want of Intelligence; for it is hardly credible, that repeated Remonstrances have been transmitted from the Colonies to a certain Office, and from thence to a Superior Office; and that those Remonstrances have been either Destroyed, or left in the latter Office, sometimes unopened, always neglected, and if they still subsist, may be consulted, if not too much obliterated by Dust, as original Records of the most indefensible Security, or Negligence.

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In the mean Time the French, whose Policy I am forry to Commend, have acted upon one regular System, from the Treaty of Utrecht to the present Time. No Change of Administration hath in the least varied the System. The Increase of their Territory, and the Diminution of our Power in America was the Object. Every Measure taken in that Part of the World hath contributed to the Prosecution of this End; and, it is not unseasonable to utter so Melancholy a Truth, we Ourselves have been no small Contributers.

Their Hostilities were commenced before the War, and have been uniformly carried on since the Peace. We neither availed ourselves of the War to disposies them of our Property; nor, when we were negotiating a Peace, do we appear to have paid any Regard to a Point of the last Importance, which may involve us, sooner

than we apprehend, in extreme Distress; nor, since the Conclusion of the Peace, have we, till very lately, manifested the least Spark of that Jealousy, with which Nations, as well as Individuals, should watch, and affert their Rights.

His Majesty, our BEST Protector, no sooner Knew, that the Rights of his Crown and People were invaded, than he resolved to do Justice to Himself and them. Accordingly His Parliament granted a Supply for the Purpose; and a prodigious naval Armament was raised, in a very short Space of Time, great enough to strike Terror into the Enemy, and to promise us Peace and Security at home. We have heard of some Success, and some Disappointment, as will be the Case, whenever an Appeal is made to the Sword. One considerable Point seems hitherto to have been gained.

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Is it probable, that in this State of Things, when we are fecured by a powerful Navy, well manned, and admirably conducted, we should, instead of increasing or strengthing our military Establishment at home, look out officiously for a War upon the Continent, before the French feem to threaten it, before our Allies feem to apprehend it; a War, in which we cannot naturally be interested, and by the Event of which we cannot possibly be benefited; a War which, tho' ever fo fuccessful, must exhaust the little Remnant of our Treasure, and which must, in the End, leave us Defenceless at Home. it probable, I fay, that we should Provoke fuch

fuch a War, that we should voluntarily seek such a Distress, nay Canvass for it in the several Courts, who have Subjects to lett; and Purchase it at an Expence, which if not attended with immediate Bankruptcy, will at least give a greater Shock to our public Credit, than it hath yet received, even from the known Weakness, and Instability of those, upon whose Characters the Credit of the Publick in great Measure depends?

Those who circulate such Rumours do not apprehend, that the only Point, for which these Subsidies can be contracted, is a War upon the Continent; and they would soon be convinced, how groundless their Rumours are, if they would take Time to consider the Impracticability of a Continent War.

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We were on the Brink of Ruin when all Sides met at Aix-la-Chapelle, and, like litigious Men, gave up their respective Claims, because the Fund for the Contest was exhausted. Our Share of the Expence was such, as this Nation cannot support, without greater Resources, than it is hitherto known to have.

We may possibly be distressed for Ways and Means to raise two Millions yearly, besides doubling the Land-Tax, the Naval War alone will demand those Sums at least. If it be at all dissicult to raise a Supply for the only War, in which we have a Chance of Success, will you believe, that a Continent War, which the last Time we engaged in it was unsuccessful, tho' the Expence amounted at Length to eleven Millions in one Year, should now be so far premeditated, that the bare Prelude

of it, before any War at all is begun, should amount to a most exorbitant Part of the Expence?

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Our fellow Subjects in America have shewn us, where to encounter the Enemy, and what Hands are fit for the Work. Their Courage and the Success of it, have pointed out to us the Spot, upon which we may gain by Victory; for a Victory there, strikes at the Root of the War, by Dispossfelling the French of their Usurpations.

The Distress, which drove us as well as our Enemies into the last Peace, did amply Convince us, that our Wealth is not Inexhaustible; and I should dread the Answer, were it to be asked, where shall this new Continent War begin? I very much fear the Answer would be, where we lest off, at Aix-la-Chapelle. If so, how much Richer is this Kingdom, than it was at that Period? Or rather, how much less Poor? What

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What Alliances have been contracted in the intermediate Space, upon which to depend for Assistance? For subsidy Treaties are as foreign to Alliances, as mercenary Contracts and Engagements are, to the disinterested Union of honourable Friend-simp.

If a War upon the Continent was so intolerable a Burthen, that all Friends to their Country united in Acclamations of Joy for the Peace; if since the Peace, we have not yet been enabled to reduce more than a fortieth Part of the national Debt; and if we must become Debtors again for that Sum immediately, even tho' we should escape paying subsidy Money, and exert none but our natural Strength, how shall we support a Necessary, but Expensive War, upon the Continent of America, consistently with an unnecessary, but inevitably ruinous one in the Netherlands.

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These must be the Schemes of some great comprehensive Minds, too enlarged to confine their Views within the narrow Space of a Closet. That the Neglects complained of should be imputable to men; who Ignorant of the Geography or the History of the World; regardless of the Interests of their Master, or the Complaints of their Fellow-Subjects, extend their Thoughts no farther, than that Closet, is much more Natural and Credible.

Their are Empirics in all Professions. Ignorance, and Rashness are as much their Characteristics in Politics, as in Physic. But I cannot conceive the Existence of such Empirics as an Adviser, and an Adopter of a Measure like this. I cannot imagine any Man to have Weight enough to GIVE, or to Adopt the Advice, who is regardless Enough of his Character, to avow the Measure;

Measure; and the Nation that resigns itself Chearfully, to so desperate an Operation, is of all Valetudinarians the Weakest.

I have heard of unaccountable Things done by Perfons in Health, to prevent a Sickness; and of Physicians, who rather than forfeit the good Opinion of a Patient, have humoured him, in an unwarrantable Prescription.

But I never heard an Instance of a Phyfician bold enough, upon the Eruption of a Pimple, to order his Patient to be bliftered, cupped, and blooded; and, after all the other Evacuations, to be left with the perpetual Drain of a Dozen Issues.

The Powers of the College might not be sufficient to restrain and punish so Dangerous a Practitioner. He might find an Apothecary, who, upon seeing his Account

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count in the Prescription, might have the Effrontery to Adopt it, and to talk, even unlike an Apothecary, when he stands up in Support of his Doctor.

But two such Men, if left to themselves, would Depopulate a Kingdom, in much less Time, than a victorious Army could conquer it. Their Success would in Time create in themselves an Opinion, that the Practice was Right; and if they should receive a Negative Protection, from the Silence of their Enemies, they would represent all those Enemies, as Enemies to Mankind.

The Opponents of this Measure have been already represented, as Enemies to the Whig Cause, by Persons, to whom that Cause has very slender Obligations. But the Charge is received with a due Contempt. True Whigs will for ever oppose the Encroachments of France, and chearfully support a Necessary War on the

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and on the Example of our Whig Ancestors to urge it, as a Motive to an UNNECESSARY Continent War; and to a preparatory Expence, so very Extravagant, as will absolutely Disable us from engaging in such a War, if it should become needful.

But there is another View, in which this Measure is considered, and which to do Justice to it, should not be passed over. It is called a Measure of Diversion. Our Interest we are told, is to withdraw the Attention of the Enemy from the Sea, and from our Colonies; and this Measure will most effectually Answer the End.

The Plea would be a very specious one, were not the Means manifestly Destructive, even of the End itself. For the Diversion would be so immensely Expensive,

five, that any Success at Sea, and the Conquest of all the French Possessions in America, would not be equivalent to the Expence sustained, I mean by this Nation, in its present Circumstances of Debts and Credit.

The mere Chance of Safety can never be worth purchasing, at the Price of certain inevitable Ruin. And how comes it to pass, if the Prevention of these Encroachments was not worth a Memorial, that the mere Chance of recovering our Territory, by the Diversion of the Enemy, should be estimated at an infinitely greater Sum, than the best and wisest Conductors will know how to raise?

Can we suppose Men, whose Timidity or Negligence has been so Notorious, in the Progress of these American Encroachments, to rush so suddenly into the contrary Extreme?

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I can easily imagine a timorous Man to observe no Proportion, in the Means he chuses for his Safety? I can imagine him first to hide himself from the Danger, and upon the nearer Approach of it, to employ a Train of Artillery, in the Destruction of a Rat.

But that this same timorous Man should call it diverting an Enemy at a Distance, to bring him nearer Home; so near that even his Domestics may be sent out to Encounter him, and that his very Spits may be converted into Swords, whilst his Cooks and Parasites are fighting *Pro focis*; this is an Inconsistency of Conduct, and Character, which I cannot imagine, even amidst all the new Men, and new Events, which the World is continually exhibiting.

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I have indeed heard credulous Men, who are apt to swallow more than they can Digest, take the Fact for granted, and Reason upon it, in a Manner, which provoked my Indignation, even more than the Fact itself. I have heard them call it the Measure of a Person, whose Name is profaned by the Mention of him, as the Patron of so unpopular a Conduct.

It is Invidious to deliver an Opinion, how it may become Great-Britain to act, if HisMajesty's Electoral Dominions should be invaded. Were I obliged to answer the Question, I should give the Answer of a Loyal Grateful Subject, that even in that Case, his Majesty deserves any Thing he can demand from his People.

But let me at the same Time speak the Language of an Englishman. I would rather the whole Empire were covered with wit fed the der

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with the Arms of France, than the Affections of my Countrymen alienated from the present King, and his Royal Descendents, or his British Power weakened, by the Ruin of his British Subjects.

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We have such undeniable Evidence of the Magnanimity of our present Sovereign, that whoever has the Courage to speak this Language, may rest assured of his Approbation.

If we could suppose the Question to be humbly proposed to his Majesty, whether he would chuse to give up Great-Britain, for the Preservation of Hanover? his Answer would infallibly be Negative, and would rejoice every Heart in these Kingdoms, except only those desperate Men, who are striving so officiously to Out-Hanover each other.

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If such would be the Answer to one Question, which so very sew have the Courage to propose, it may not be too presumptuous to form, or anticipate the Answer to another; whether His Majesty would chuse to give up the Happiness or Welfare of Great-Britain, without the Benefit of securing Hanover? And the latter might much more probably sollow from a Continent War, than the former.

There are some Advocates, among the Few, that have hired out their Talents to these imaginary Subsidies, who claim the Protection of Hanover, as Matter of national Justice, on the Part of Great-Britain, upon this Plea; that the Danger apprehended to those Dominions arises only from the Rupture betwixt us and France.

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If we are OBLIGED to fuccour his Majesty's Electoral Dominions, it is either because they are subject to the same Prince, or because we are in general obliged to indemnify every State, which fuffers Loss, or Inconvenience, by the Course of the War. If the former be infifted on, it will be found, upon Inquiry, to be an Obligation of Personal Grati-TUDE, rather than JUSTICE. When it is founded on this Motive, very few good Subjects would be rigid enough to difpute the Claim with the prefent King. But the Dominions are too distinct from Great-Britain, in every Sense, to support a Demand of national Justice, upon the fingle Principle of His Majesty's being the Sovereign of Both.

If the other be the Plea, that Justice obliges us to indemnify those States, who F 2 fuffer

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fuffer in the Course of the War; then the Demand is equally Obligatory upon France, and Hanover can be only one Claimant amongst a Multitude, and will hardly receive such Support from the Law of Nations, as will Authorize her to Exhaust our Treasure, in the Pay of Mercenaries for her Desence.

But it is probable after all, whatever their Destination may be, that Hanover may receive no more Benefit from these Mercenaries, from the Rushans at least, than Great-Britain, or Ireland. They may meet with insuperable Difficulties in their March; and may possibly enter some Countries in Germany, which might be at a Loss to subsist an Army of Seventy Three Thousand Men.

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It will moreover, independently of all these Considerations, be naturally asked by a free Britan, if this Measure were taken. Why was it not proposed to Parliament last Winter? It was certainly meditated then, unless the Adviser of it would assume more Precipitancy, than even his Enemies lay to his Charge.

If it was meditated then, would it not have appeared in a much more favourable Light, with the Authority of a previous Concurrence of Parliament; or is it not rather a strong Argument against the Probability of such a Measure, that a Whig Ministry cannot be supposed to Presume the Consent of Parliament, in the Disposal of publick Money?

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If it should be urged, that these Tream, ties after all, are not so Absurd, or Improbable probable as I represent them; that it may be a British Measure, meant for the Security of these Islands, in Case of an Invasion, I must even then confess myself as Incredulous as ever; for, in that View of it, I cannot conceive a Step more unnatural, or more irreconcileable to the Panic pretended.

If an Invasion were truly apprehended, Prudence or Policy would not direct us to have Recourse to a mercenary Army, much more distant than the Enemy; an Army, which must clear its Way, by Fire and Sword, through the Dominions of very powerful Princes; which, when arrived, might have some Pretence, like the Hessians in 1745, for declining to act; and an Army, to which it would be some National Disgrace to owe our Preservation.

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There is a more Natural and a more Obvious Conduct, for the Reception of an Invader, which no Conductor of Men or Affairs, however Blinded, or however Hurried, can possibly pass over, without a Deliberate Intention. It is to call forth our Internal Strength, to Increase the Military Establishment, or to Arm and Exercise the Militia, and a Kingdom, which hath not sufficient Internal Strength for its own Security; is, though assisted by a Million of Mercenaries, in as weak, and as frail a Condition, at Last, as a Kingdom divided against itself.

In this infirm State, Auxiliary or Mercenary Troops are as formidable as Enemies. They may repel an Invader, but they will derive from the Victory greater and stronger Claims than any Invader could

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could pretend, for they will be enabled more effectually to enforce any Claims.

But, God be thanked, we are not yet fo defenceless as to have Cause to dread, either Enemies or Mercenaries; and, whenever the Invasion appears to be really intended, we have the Confidence to hope, that this Kingdom will escape the Danger of becoming a Province to France, without rushing into the Ignominy of becoming tributary to Rusia or Hesse.

So many are the Reasons I have for withholding my Credit from the malignant Report which alarms you. You mention indeed another Piece of News, in confirmation of it, which, if true, may justify your Alarm, but for the present confirms my Incredulity.

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It is rumoured, you fay, that a Gentleman, no less conspicuous in Character than in Office, nauseated the Draught when it was abruptly administered to him. This is the Rumour throughout the Kingdom, and it is universally known that a Person of his Probity would act the Right Part.

But, is it at all credible, that one of the most unblemished Characters in the Kingdom, in an Office which supposes very great Considence, should be distinguished by the Neglect of not being consulted, or, if I apprehend you right, of not being even apprized of so important a Measure?

It may, for very strong Reasons, be the present Policy to render the best and worthiest Men the most insignificant. But there can be no Reasons, either of Prudence

or Necessity, for Avowing such a Conduct, and Declaring to the Public, that it is a Demerit, or rather a Crime, to be Esteemed and Consided in, by all Ranks of Men.

However, notwithstanding all this Reafoning, I am still liable to be told, that Arguments à priori, conclusive as they are, avail nothing against the Stubborness of a plain Matter of Fact; and, if these Treaties are actually concluded, it will not be the less true, though I should invent a Thousand Reasons, to shew the Improbability of it.

It is too true, my Friend, that the most improbable, and the least desirable, Event, will sometimes take Place. If this should be the Case at present, I must convert my Arguments into such bitter

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If old John of Gaunt, who is reprefented to have broke his Heart, because the Dignity of the Kingdom was proftituted, by farming the Public Revenues, had been a Witness to the Present State of the Nation, to our Naval Strength, to the Loyalty and Public-spirit of great Part of the People, and, at the same Time, a Witness to a Measure, so derogatory to the Honour both of the Crown and the Kingdom, as Imploring and Procuring, with a BORROWED Sum, the Aid of Princes, whose Dominions were, till very lately, a Defart, and whose Subjects are at this Day little better than Savages, the Pride of his British Spirit might have Impelled him to lay Violent Hands upon himself. The The Times indeed require a very different Exercise of our Zeal, and no Times will Justify this Method of venting it. But as men vary in their Tempers and Understandings, they will be variously affected by Public Events, and accordingly this Measure will most deeply afflict those Worthy Members of the Community who murmur least.

I shall consider myself in the Case of a Passenger in a Vessel, of which the Pilot was Self-willed, Over-bearing, Negligent, sometimes Rash, sometimes Timorous, seldom in the Right, but most obstinate when most in the Wrong, Feared, but Ridiculed, Disturbed and Disliked by the Majority of the Crew. A Mutiny was every Moment expected, but a Boatswain, who, by lively Parts, an ingenious Way of Talking, and by affecting an irreconcilable Hatred towards the Pilot, had obtained or assumed Weight enough to take upon himself the Conduct of the Men, with great Difficulty preserved the Peace for some Time.

It was observed at last, by a skilful Mariner, that the Headstrong Pilot was steering directly towards a Rock. The Boatswain was called upon to expostulate with him; and, by convincing him of the Danger, to rescue his Friends from certain Destruction.

But, to the Surprise of the whole Ship's Company, the Boatswain, who, till that Moment

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Moment had Judiciously Concealed his Opinion, now declared Boldly, in the very Face of the Rock, that the Conduct of the Pilot was Judicious, that himfelf was resolved to defend it, and, if he heard any Complaints, he should Report them to the Captain, who would know how to Quell this Mutinous Spirit.

The Passenger was a Melancholy Witness to what Passed, and Retired to his Cabin in Tears. He saw the Power of the Pilot, and the Effrontery of the Boatswain. Nothing remained for him, but to Lament his hard Fate, to be facrificed to the Folly and Obstinacy of one Man, and the Avowed Profligacy of another. He was under the unhappy Necessity of Resigning himself, but neither Religion, nor Philosophy, could move him

him to a Chearful Refignation, when he faw the Rock before him, and himself Involved in a Calamity, Wilfully incurred by others.

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I must leave you to apply this Story, and conclude with the strongest Assurance, that I remain,

Dear Sir

Yours, &c. &c.

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